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Abstract—Starting from a practical use of Reed-Solomon codes
in a cryptographic scheme published in Indocrypt’09, this paper
deals with the threshold of linear q-ary error-correcting codes.
The security of this scheme is based on the intractability of
polynomial reconstruction when there is too much noise in
the vector. Our approach switches from this paradigm to an
Information Theoretical point of view: is there a class of elements
that are so far away from the code that the list size is always
superpolynomial? Or, dually speaking, is Maximum-Likelihood
decoding almost surely impossible?
We relate this issue to the decoding threshold of a code, and
show that when the minimal distance of the code is high enough,
the threshold effect is very sharp. In a second part, we explicit
lower-bounds on the threshold of Maximum-Distance Separable
codes such as Reed-Solomon codes, and compute the threshold
for the toy example that motivates this study.
I. INTRODUCTION
In [1], Bringer et al. proposed a low-cost mutual authen-
tication protocol, that uses a Reed-Solomon code structure.
This protocol is pretty simple: Bob owns two secret polyno-
mials Pb, P ′b of degree less than k known only by Alice; to
authenticate herself to Bob, Alice proves the knowledge of
Pb by sending 〈i, Pb(αi)〉 where αi is the i-th element of a
Fq. Bob proves his identity by replying with 〈P ′b(αi)〉. This
protocol is made such that if Alice speaks to a lot of persons,
it is hard to trace Bob out of all the conversations, and it
is hard to impersonate Alice (or Bob). The security of the
protocol is based on an algorithmic assumption, saying that the
polynomial reconstruction problem is hard for the vectors of
F
n
q that are far enough from the code. Indeed, the best known
algorithms solving polynomial reconstruction are those of
Guruswami-Sudan [2] and, on a related problem, Guruswami-
Rudra [3], which can basically reconstruct a polynomial given√
kn correct values.
This algorithmic security result is somehow unsatisfying,
for it is possible to exhibit better decoding algorithm. We
therefore take interest in the information-theoretic aspect of
such a problem.
The solution of the problem raised by [1] is to look at the
output of a list-decoder centered around the received values,
and to output the possible polynomials as candidate values for
Pb or P
′
b. Our approach consists in looking at a usually ignored
side of list-decoding, which is to look at the radii r such that
list-decoding a word with radius r provides a list that is always
lower-bounded by a large enough number. This differs from
the literature concerning list-decoding, which usually looks
for radii for which the size is always upper-bounded by a
maximum list size, or tries to exhibit a counter-example.
The “large enough” list size can be obtained easily by
imposing that Maximum-Likelihood Decoding to be most im-
probable. For that, we focus on the all-or-nothing behaviour of
the ML decoder. Inspired by percolation theory [4], and code-
applied graph theory [5], we will show how it is possible to
conservatively estimate, before, after, and around a threshold,
the all-or-nothing probability of ML decoding.
II. THE THRESHOLD OF A CODE
The existence of a threshold is motivated by the classical
question of percolation : given a graph, with a source, and
a sink, and given the probability p for a “wet” node of the
graph to “wet” an adjacent node, what is the probability for
the source to wet the sink? It appears that this probability has a
threshold effect; in other words, there exists a limit probability
pc such that, if p > pc, then the sink is almost surely wet, and
if p < pc, then the sink is almost never wet. The threshold
effect is illustrated in Fig 1.
This question can be transposed into the probability of
error-correcting a code. Given a proportion of errors p, with
a decoding algorithm, what is the probability of correctly
recovering the sent codeword? It was shown in [6] that
for every binary code, and every decoding algorithm, this
probability also follows a threshold.
In this paper, we show that this property also applies to q-
ary codes. In the following part, we show that the threshold
behaviour that was seen on binary codes can be obtained again.
A. The Margulis-Russo Identity
The technique used to derive threshold effects in discrete
spaces is to integrate an isoperimetric inequality; for that, the
Margulis-Russo identity is required.
Let H = {0, 1}n be the Hamming space; the Hamming
distance d(x, y) provides the number of different coordinates
between vectors x and y. Consider the measure µp : H →
[0, 1] defined by µp(x) = pw(x)(1 − p)n−w(x) where w(x) is
the Hamming weight of x. The number of limit-vectors of a
subset A ⊂ H is a function defined as hA(x) = |B(x, 1)∩A|
for x ∈ A.
For A ⊂ H such that A is increasing (i.e. if x ∈ A, and
y ≥ x, then y ∈ A with ≥ defined component-wise), Margulis
and Russo showed :
dµp(A)
dp
=
1
p
∫
A
hA(x)dµp(x)
Let q ∈ N, q > 2. This section shows that this equality is
also true in Hq = {0, ...q − 1}n.
For a vector x ∈ Hq , the support of x is the set of all its
non-null coordinates, i.e. supp(x) = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : xi 6=
0}. Define the measure function µp(x) =
(
p
q−1
)w(x)
(1 −
p)n−w(x) with w(x) = |supp(x)| the weight of x. This
definition is consistent with a measure, as µp(Hn) =∑
x∈Hq µp(x) = 1.
Note the inclusion ⊂ to be the relation between a set and a
(general) subset (i.e. for all X , X ⊂ X). The support inclusion
generalises the component-wise ≤ that was used in the binary
case.
Lemma 1 (Margulis-Russo Identity over q-ary alphabets):
Let A be an increasing subset of Hq , i.e. such that if y ∈ A,
for all x ∈ Hq such that supp(y) ⊂ supp(x), then x ∈ A.
Then
dµp(A)
dp
=
1
p
∫
A
hA(x)dµp(x)
Proof: The proof of this lemma is an adaptation of
Margulis’ proof in [7]. For this, we use the notation:
• [A,B] = |{x, y} ∈ A × B : d(x, y) = 1| where A,B ⊂
Hq , is the number of links from A to B
• for k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, Zk = {x ∈ Hq : w(x) = k},
• for A ⊂ Hq , Ak = A∩Zk (A is the reunion of the Ak);
• Dk =
∑
x∈Ak hA(x) is the number of limit-vectors next
to elements of weight k.
Trivially, Dk = [Ak, Zk+1−Ak+1]+ [Ak, Zk−1−Ak−1]+
[Ak, Zk −Ak]. We now note that :
• [Ak, Zk−1] = |Ak|k, as to go from Ak to Zk−1, the only
way (in one move) is to put one coordinate to 0;
• [Ak, Zk+1] = |Ak|(n−k)(q−1) with the same reasoning;
• [Ak, Zk − Ak] = [Ak, Zk+1 − Ak+1] = 0 as A is
increasing.
• Combining these equalities, we get [Ak, Ak+1] =
|Ak|(n− k)(q − 1);
• [Ak, Zk] = 0 as it is necessary to put a non-null
coordinate to 0 and a null one to {1, ...q − 1}.
Finally Dk = [Ak, Zk−1]− [Ak, Ak−1] = k|Ak|− (n− k+
1)(q − 1)|Ak−1| for k > 0 and D0 = 0 (or A = Hq).
Back to the identity desired, we observe that
∫
A
hA(x)dµp(x) =
n∑
k=0
∑
x∈Ak
hA(x)(
p
q − 1)
k(1 − p)n−k
=
n∑
k=0
Dk
(
p
q − 1
)k
(1− p)n−k
=
n∑
k=1
(k|Ak| − (n− k + 1)(q − 1)|Ak−1|)
·
(
p
q − 1
)k
(1− p)n−k
=
∑n
k=0 |Ak|(k − pn−k1−p )
(
p
q−1
)k
(1− p)n−k
on the other hand,
dµp(A)
dp
=
∑n
k=0 |Ak| ddp
((
p
q−1
)k
(1 − p)n−k
)
=
∑n
k=0 |Ak|
(
p
q−1
)k
(1− p)n−k
(
k
p
+ −(n−k)1−p
)
Hence the identity.
This lemma shows that the Margulis-Russo identity is also
true on {0...(q − 1)}n; it was the keystone of the reasoning
done in [5] to show an explicit form of the threshold behaviour
of Maximum-Likelihood Error Correction.
B. A Threshold for Error-Decoding q-ary codes
In the following, we use ϕ(t) = 1√
2pi
e−
t2
2 the normal distri-
bution, Φ(x) =
∫ x
−∞ ϕ(t)dt the accumulate normal function,
and Ψ(x) = ϕ(Φ−1(x)) (so that ∀x,Ψ(x) · Φ′−1(x) = 1).
A monotone property is a set A ⊂ Hq such that A is
increasing, or A is increasing.
Theorem 1: Let A be a monotone property of Hq . Suppose
that ∀x ∈ A, hA(x) = 0 or hA(x) ≥ ∆.
Let θ ∈ [0, 1] be (the unique real) such that µθ(A) = 12 . Let
gθ(p) = Φ
(√
2∆(
√− ln θ −√− ln p)
)
.
Then the measure of A, µp(A) is bounded by :
µp(A) ≤ gθ(p) for p ∈]0; θ]
µp(A) ≥ gθ(p) for p ∈ [θ; 1[
Sketch of Proof
The proof is exactly the same as the one from [5]. The whole
idea is to derive the upper-range:∫
A
√
hAdµp ≥
√
2 ln
1
p
Ψ(µp(A))
The integration of this equation, together with the Margulis-
Russo lemma, gives the result.
To conclude this part, we remark that the non-decoding
region of a given point, for a q-ary code, is an increasing
region of Fnq . For linear codes, this non-decoding region can
always be translated to that of 0 without loss of generality; let
A0 = {x ∈ Fnq s.t. ∃c ∈ C, c 6= 0 : d(x, c) ≤ d(x, 0)}. The
probability of error decoding of C is then µp(A0).
For x ∈ µp(A0), we show that either hA0(x) = 0, or
hA0(x) ≥ d2 . Indeed, if hA0(x) > 0, then x is nearer to a
non-null codeword c than to 0. Then all the vectors obtained
by replacing one of the coordinates of x by 0 are out of A0; in
particular, hA0(x) ≥ d(x, 0). Let dc = d(c, 0) be the weight
of c; as x is nearer to c than to 0, d(x, 0) ≥ dc2 . Thus the
previous assertion.
Combining the previous results, we just showed that for any
q-ary code, the probability of error is, as for binary codes,
bounded by a threshold function. This can be expressed by
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Figure 1. Illustration of the threshold effect, d = 400, pc = 0.7
the following theorem, which has the same form as the one
showed in [5]:
Theorem 2: Let C be a code of any length, and of minimal
distance d. Over the q-ary symmetric channel, with transition
probability p, the probability of decoding error Pe(p) associ-
ated with C is such that there exists a unique pc ∈]0; 1| such
that Pe(pc) = 12 , and Pe is bounded by:
Pe(p) S 1− Φ(
√
d(
√
− ln(1− pc)−
√
− ln(1− p)))
The upper-bound (≤) is true when p ∈]0; pc]; the lower-bound
(≥) is true when p ∈ [pc; 1[.
Even though linearity was used not to lose any generality
previously, it is not a requirement for this theorem. Indeed, the
bounding equations are true for every codeword c by replacing
d by minc′∈C,c‘ 6=c d(c, c′). Assuming that the codewords sent
are distributed in a uniform way over C, we thus obtain this
result.
The behaviour of this function is illustrated in Fig 1. Around
p ≈ 0 (actually, for all p < pc − ǫ...), Pe is extremely flat
around 0; around p ≈ 1 (and, symmetrically, for all p > pc+ǫ,
Pe is extremely flat around 1. Finally, around the threshold
pc, the slope is
√
d√
2pi(1−pc) , which is almost vertical when the
minimal distance d is large.
III. EXPLICIT COMPUTATION OF THE THRESHOLD FOR
MAXIMUM-DISTANCE SEPARABLE CODES
In this section, we only take interest in linear codes over
F
n
q .
A. Another Estimation of the Decoding Threshold
By linearity, we can again without loss of generality assume
that the sent codeword was the all null vector. It is possible to
have a rough estimation of the probability of wrongly decoding
with crossover probability p correctly a vector by computing
the proportion of vectors x ∈ Fnq of weight less or equal to
np that are closer to a non-null codeword than to 0. Let g(p)
be this proportion.
g(p) =
| {x : s.t. ∃c ∈ C, c 6= 0 : d(x, c) 6= w(x) ≤ np} |
| {x : w(x) ≤ np} | .
Let vol(q, n, t) = 1
n
logq (|B(t)|), where B(t) is the Ham-
ming ball of radius t, ( for example, centered on 0) in Fnq . It is
well known that when t ≤ q−1
q
, vol(q, n, t) = Hq(
t
n
)+on(1),
where Hq(x) = −x logq x−(1−x) logq(1−x)+x logq(q−1)
is the q-ary entropy of x ∈ [0, 1].
To compute the numerator, we suggest, for each codeword
c ∈ C that has a weight between d and 2pn, to compute the
number of vectors x that are nearer to c than to 0. This number
actually only depends on the weight of c, and will be noted
νpn(w(c)). As there are Aw(c) codewords of weight w(c) in
the code (with the standard notation), the function g(p) can
be approximated by:
g(p) ≤
∑2pn
l=d Alνpn(l)
qnvol(q,n,pn)
(1)
The different quantities used in this equation are illustrated
in Fig 2.
Figure 2. Different quantities used in Eq 1
νt(w) is explicited hereafter. Let c be a codeword of weight
w. Let x ∈ Fnq be a vector with the following constraints:
• d(x, 0) ≤ t, i.e. x is the result of the transmission of 0
with at most t errors.
• d(x, 0) ≥ d(x, c), i.e. x is wrongly decoded.
We note α the number of coordinates i in x such that xi 6= ci
and xi = 0; β is the number of coordinates i such that xi 6= ci
and xi 6= 0; γ is the number of coordinates i such that xi 6= ci
and ci = 0.
The previous constraints on x can be rewritten into the
system (S):
(S) :


1) 0 ≤ α, β ≤ w
2) 0 ≤ γ ≤ n− w
3) γ ≤ t+ α− w
4) β + γ ≤ t
5) 2α+ β ≤ w
We then obtain
νt(w) =
∑
α,β,γ
(
w
α+ β
)(
α+ β
β
)
(q − 2)β
(
n− w
γ
)
(q − 1)γ .
Remark 1: It is easy to see that νt(w) is at most the volume
of a ball of radius w − d2 ; this estimation will be used in the
next part.
B. Application to MDS codes
Maximum-Distance Separable (MDS) Codes are codes such
that their dimension k and minimal distance d fulfil the
Singleton bound, so that:
k + d = n− 1.
A well known family of MDS codes are the Reed-Solomon
codes, for which a codeword is made of the evaluation of a
degree k − 1 polynomial over n field elements α1, . . . , αn.
Reed-Solomon codes over Fq can have a length up to q − 1,
but shorter such codes are also MDS.
For MDS codes, the number Al of codewords of given
weight is known. This number is:
An−i =
n−1∑
j=1
(−1)j−i
(
n
j
)(
j
i
)
(qk−j − 1)
From this identity, it is easy to derive the more usable
formula:
Al =
(
n
l
) l−d∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
l
j
)
(q1+l−d−j − 1) (2)
It is now possible to approximate quite nicely the error
probability while under the threshold - indeed, the numerator
and denominator are correct as long as a vector x is not close
to 2 different codewords with a weight in the range [d; pn],
i.e. as long as the list of codewords at a distance less than pn
from x is reduced to a single element.
C. Short MDS Codes over Large Fields
We now focus on the specific problem presented in the
Introduction, and motivated by the beckoning and authenti-
cation protocol from [1]. This setting is characterized by the
following:
• The underlying code is a Reed-Solomon over a field Fq;
• The field size q is very large for cryptographic reasons;
• The code length n is very short (with respect to q) as nq
is the size of embedded low-cost devices’ memory.
This application fits into the framework depicted in the
previous sections. Moreover, the information “n much smaller
than q” (n = o(q)) enables to compute an asymptotic first
order estimation of the threshold in such codes.
Indeed, if g(p) ≤ f(p), then g−1(12 ) ≥ f−1(12 ). We now
compute an upper-bound on g(p), to derive an estimation on
the threshold θ. More precisely, we aim at computing ι(p)
the first-order value of logq (g(p)); then, ι−1(0) is a lower-
approximation of the threshold.
To estimate the weight enumerator Al, we use formula (2)
to derive
Al ≤ (l − d)
(
n
l
)
2lq1+l−d ≤ n2n+lq1+l−d.
The number of targetted vectors for each codeword νt(l)
is not easy to evaluate; we note its first order development
logq νt(l) = nµ(l, t) + oq(1), so that νt(l) ≤ qnµ(l,t) · oq(q).
(Here, the term o(q) is a bounded by a polynomial in n.) We
know that
0 ≤ nµ(l, t) ≤ l − d
2
(3)
Combining these elements with equation (1), we obtain
g(p) ≤∑2pnl=d o(q)q1+l−d+µ(l,pn)−nvol(q,n,pn).
As vol(q, n, t) = Hq( tn ) + on(1) =
t
n
+ oq(1),
the first order of g(p) is bounded by: logq g(p) ≤
maxl∈[d,pn] (1 + l − d− pn+ nµ(l, pn)) + oq(1).
The bounding (3) of µ shows that the right-hand side of
this inequality is between 1+pn−d and 1+3pn− 3d2 , which
shows that the threshold g−1(12 ) is asymptotically between
δ
2
and δ.
Unfortunately, a more precise evaluation of µ strongly
depends on the context. Indeed, according to Section III-A,
ν(l, t) = oq(q) · max
α,β,γ:(S)
qβ+γ
(
n− l
γ
)(
l
α+ β
)(
α+ β
β
)
.
This maximum can be obtained by evaluating the term to
be maximized on all vertices of the polytope defined by the
system (S) ((S) is made of 9 inequalities of 3 unknown, the
vertices are obtained by selecting 3 of these equations, thus at
most
(
9
3
)
= 84 vertices); however, it is not possible to exhibit
here a general answer as the solution depends on the minimal
distance of the code, i.e. on the rate of the Reed-Solomon
code.
D. Numerical Application to a (2048, 256, 1793)264 MDS
Code
In the case of a code over a finite field of reasonable
dimension, it is possible to exactly compute the ratio that
approximates the Maximum Likelihood threshold. However,
the exact threshold cannot be easily computed yet; it is still
an open problem related to the list-decoding capacity of Reed-
Solomon codes.
We therefore used the NTL open-source library [8] to
compute the values Al, νt(l) and |B(t)| in order to have
an accurate enough approximation of the the function g(p)
described earlier. The parameters are those that were proposed
in [1], and show that the decoding threshold of such a code
is between 0.8 and 0.875.
The slope around the threshold is around 115, so for p
“small” (in fact, a bit smaller than pc) g(p) is very near to 0,
while as p goes to 1, g(p) is much greater than the maximum
probability of 1. This was predicted earlier, and expresses the
fact that the list-size of radius pn is always greater than 1.
The threshold value g−1(12 ) ≈ ι−1(0) is a lower-bound for
the threshold of the code, though the intuition says that this
lower-bound is pretty near to the real threshold.
IV. CONCLUSION
As a conclusion, let us look back to the starting point of
our reasoning. The initial goal was to revise the conditions of
security of the construction depicted in [1]: from a received
vector x of Fnq , for what parameters is the size of the
list of radius pn exponentially large? This problem can be
reduced to that of the threshold probability of a linear error-
correcting code. Indeed, below the threshold of the code, when
the minimal distance of the code is large enough, the error
decoding probability of the code is exponentially small, and it
is exponentially close to 1 above the threshold. For our class of
parameters, ensuring that the error rate is above the threshold
is enough to show the security of the scheme.
We then showed that the threshold behaviour can be ex-
plicited for q-ary codes as well as for binary codes; we then
explicited a lower-bound on the threshold of MDS codes.
Applying these results to the initial problem, we show that
the threshold for a (highly) truncated Reed-Solomon code over
a finite field F264 is very near to normalized the minimal
distance d = n − k + 1 of this code. As a conclusion, to
switch from an algorithmic assumption (the hardness of the
Polynomial Reconstruction Problem, see [9]) to Information-
Theoretical security, we recommend to raise the dimension k
of the underlying code. This lowers the decoding threshold of
the code; the downside is that storage of a codeword is more
costly.
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